DID FORWARD OBSERVERS
WIN
THE BATTLE OF FORT MACON?
(published in the Summer '02 Ramparts)
Before the days of rifled artillery, most cannon had a range
of little more than one mile. Artillery pieces were always emplaced
within sight of the enemy target. Gunners were expected to aim at the
target and make appropriate adjustments if their shots missed the target.
It was fairly easy to see if you were hitting right or left of the target.
But much more difficult to tell if your rounds were passing over the target,
especially when your vision was obscured by the smoke produced by the black
powder charges in your own and adjacent guns.
In more recent times, when artillery ranges had been extended to 8 to 10
miles or more, targets were almost always out of sight of the gunners.
It then became necessary to have forward observers on the ground or
in aircraft who could see where the rounds were landing, and communicate
needed adjustments by radio or land lines to the Fire Direction Center at
the guns.
Before the Union attack on Fort Macon began on April 25, 1862, the
Federals established several signal stations in order to facilitate communications
and coordination between General Parke’s attacking forces and General Burnside’s
command aboard the Alice Price in the sound. One of these semaphore
signal stations was located on the top porch of the Atlantic Hotel in Beaufort.
Although it hadn’t been planned, the Beaufort signal station was in a position
to see that most of the artillery rounds fired by the smoke blinded Union
gunners were passing over the Fort and splashing harmlessly in the water
of the sound.
The following report filed by the signal officer in Beaufort after the battle
describes what happened on April 25, 1862.
Report of Lieut. William S. Andrews, Ninth New York Infantry,
Acting Signal Officer
Beaufort, N.C., May 1,1862
Major: Fort Macon fell on the 25th of April. I believe that never
in the history of warfare have signals been used with more complete success
or to greater advantage than during the siege of that place. When operations
were commenced against Fort Macon, between four and five weeks ago, I was
ordered to open a station at this place to communicate with General Parke’s
headquarters via Morehead City and with the blockading squadron. From
that time until the 25th instant all orders were sent and received by signals.
At times no other communication was had with headquarters, it being unsafe
for boats to cross the harbor except under cover of the night. From
my station (less than 2 miles distant from the fort) I could with the aid
of glasses observe distinctly the movements of the enemy, as, for instance,
should a force go out to attack our troops at work on the siege batteries
or any alteration be made in to be immediately known at headquarters, and
of which our men could have no knowledge from their position. On my
representing this fact to General Parke he ordered a station to be open on
Bogue Banks, near our batteries, to receive official messages only, having
reference to observations made from my station (this station was at different
times worked by Lieutenants Marsh, Lyon, and Palmer, and was several times
fired upon the enemy). By this arrangement the enemy were held under
a complete surveillance during daylight. I was the only officer on
the Beaufort station until the 21st instant, when Lieut. Marvin Wait reported
for duty.
On the night preceding the bombardment a number of important
official messages were sent and received in communication between General
Burnside’s headquarters on board the steamer Alice Price lying in Core Sound
back of Beaufort and General Parke.
The bombardment commenced on the 25th instant at 6 a.
m. I had expected to receive special instructions to watch and report
the accuracy of fire; but not receiving them, I determined to act upon my
own responsibility. My station was at very nearly a right angle with
the line of fire, so that I was enabled to judge with accuracy the distance
over or short that the shot fell. The 10 inch shell were falling almost
without exception more than 300 yards beyond the fort. Lieutenant Wait and
myself continued to signal to the officer in charge until the correct range
was obtained. The 8 inch shell were falling short; we signaled to the
officer in charge of that battery with the same effect. The same was
the case with the Parrott guns, which were much elevated. From the position
of our batteries it was impossible for the officers in charge of them to
see how their shot fell; but owing to the observations made by Lieutenant
Wait and myself and signaled to them from time to time, an accurate range
was obtained by all the batteries, and was not lost during the day.
After 12 m. every shot fired from our batteries fell in or on the fort.
The accuracy of fire astonished ourselves equally with the enemy. From
that time until 4 p. m., when a white flag appeared upon the fort and the
firing ceased, a greater amount of execution was done than could have occurred
in twenty-four hours further bombardment without the aid of signals.
The proposition to surrender and the reply, with terms
of capitulation, were sent to and from General Burnside through this station
by Lieutenant Wait and myself. I saw General Parke immediately after
the occupation of Fort Macon by our forces. He spoke in the highest
terms of praise of the system of signals used, and extended his thanks to
the signal officers for the services they had rendered.
Constant signaling during a period of over four weeks
across a sheet of glaring water has injured my eyes somewhat.
Very respectfully,
W. S. ANDREWS
Second Lieutenant, Ninth N. Y. Vols.,
Acting Signal Officer
Maj. Albert J. Meyer
Signal Officer, U. S. Army.
Note: Beaufort’s Atlantic Hotel served as a signal station during the battle
of Fort Macon. It was also used as a military hospital for Union soldiers
during the war. In 1879 it was destroyed by a hurricane.
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